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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-3416 
________________ 
 
PATRICIA QUINN BRYSON, 
               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01258) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on April 30, 2015 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2016) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Patricia Quinn Bryson appeals the District Court’s denial of her summary 
judgment motion and grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social 
Security.  The District Court determined that substantial evidence supported the 
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Bryson’s application for Social Security 
Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 On January 6, 2010, Bryson applied for benefits on the basis that she had been 
disabled since October 13, 2009.  In his February 23, 2012 decision, the ALJ performed 
the five-step, sequential analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled.1  The 
ALJ determined that (1) Bryson has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 
October 13, 2009; (2) Bryson suffers from severe impairments, including costochondritis, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, hypertension, migraines, depression, anxiety, and 
personality disorder; (3) Bryson does not have an impairment or combination of 
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments; (4) Bryson has 
the residual functional capacity to perform a modified range of light work;2 and (5) based 
on Bryson’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are 
jobs in the national economy that Bryson can perform.  Accordingly, the ALJ concluded 
that Bryson was not disabled from October 13, 2009, through February 23, 2012.  The 
Appeals Council denied Bryson’s request for review.   
                                              
1 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 
24-25 (2003). 
2 “Light work” is defined as involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with 
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”  20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). 
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 Bryson then filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision.  The District Court 
affirmed.   
II.3 
 We review “any findings of fact made by an ALJ under the deferential ‘substantial 
evidence’ standard” and will affirm as long as the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by 
substantial evidence.4  Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” and is defined 
as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”5  If the ALJ’s 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, 
“even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”6  
 Bryson first contends that the ALJ erred by failing to meaningfully consider the 
finding of examining psychological consultant, Dr. Farangis Goshtasbpour, that Bryson’s 
preoccupation with her health issues may interfere with her ability to sustain long-term 
employment.  But the ALJ properly considered Dr. Goshtasbpour’s opinion as a whole.  
The ALJ first described Dr. Goshtasbpour’s determination that Bryson had no notable 
learning disability, was able to understand, retain, and follow instructions reasonably 
well, and had the ability to concentrate long enough to perform simple repetitive tasks.  
The ALJ then discussed Dr. Goshtasbpour’s conclusion that Bryson was stable enough to 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction to review a final administrative decision by the 
Social Security Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
4 Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
5 Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). 
6 Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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perform day-to-day work, stating that he would afford “substantial weight” to this 
opinion because it was consistent with the medical evidence.  Although the ALJ did not 
state his reasons for rejecting Dr. Goshtasbpour’s statement that Bryson may be 
preoccupied with her health issues, an ALJ need not discuss “every relevant treatment 
note” to sufficiently develop the record.7  We find that the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. 
Goshtasbpour’s opinion was more than sufficient to permit meaningful review.  
 Bryson next asserts that the ALJ erred by not recontacting Dr. Goshtasbpour.  
Under the regulation in effect at the time, an ALJ must recontact a medical source “when 
the report . . . contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not 
contain all the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medically 
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”8  This action is necessary only 
when the evidence received is “inadequate” for making a disability determination.9  That 
was not the case here.  The ALJ considered ample evidence presented by mental health 
professionals and Bryson’s own medical records.  One stray reference to Bryson’s 
preoccupation with her health condition did not render this evidence inadequate or 
confusing.  The ALJ did not, therefore, err by failing to recontact Dr. Goshtasbpour. 
                                              
7 See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Jones v. Barnhart, 
364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that an ALJ need not “use particular 
language or adhere to a particular format” but only “ensure that there is sufficient 
development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review”). 
8 Johnson v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting then-20 
C.F.R. § 416.912(e)(1)) (internal quotations omitted).  This rule was withdrawn effective 
March 26, 2012, and recontacting a medical source is now discretionary.  See 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1520b(c)-(d). 
9 See Johnson, 529 F.3d at 205.   
5 
 
 Finally, Bryson argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinion of 
Bryson’s treating physician, Dr. Edward Salopek, regarding Bryson’s residual functional 
capacity.  An ALJ generally must give “more weight” to opinions from treating 
physicians.10  When the ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion on the nature 
and severity of an impairment is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial 
evidence,” the ALJ must give that opinion “controlling weight.”11  When the medical 
evidence conflicts, however, “the ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject 
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.’”12  Here, the ALJ did not afford Dr. 
Salopek’s opinion controlling weight because it was not consistent with the medical 
evidence as a whole, with Dr. Salopek’s own treatment records, or with Bryson’s 
subjective complaints.  Despite Bryson’s claims, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 
decision to instead credit the findings of Dr. Tuan Huynh and Dr. Betron Haywood. Nor 
did the ALJ improperly use his own medical judgment in making this determination. 
III. 
 We conclude that the ALJ’s denial of Bryson’s application is supported by 
substantial evidence.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of her summary 
judgment motion and its grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of 
Social Security. 
                                              
10 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). 
11 Id.  
12 Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 
F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
